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One of the strategies the state and white capital pursued in
recent years to deal with urban unrest and stabilise the condi-
tions for further capital accumulation was to allow for the
development of an urban African middle class. Recent studies on
the urban African working class's potential to bring about a
revolution have focused on the constraining influences exerted on
these communities by sections of the co-opted African middle
classes. Scholars have argued that the emerging African middle
class is deliberately created by the state and white capital and
would be unlikely to enter ino meaningful alliances with the
African working class.
The underlying assumption in this argument is that throughout the
twentieth century, African middle classes have appeared and dis-
appeared at the whim of the state. And the Nationalist govern-
ment, having cleared the city of all African communities, and
used the amended act, (the Native I Urban Areas I Act of 1945} to
deny urban Africans entrepeneurial opportunities thus making them
almost all dependant on wage labour. II). Reacting to the crisis
of the mid-1970s, the Vorster government attempted to introduce
some reforms in 1975. After the 197b-1977 countrywide uprisings,
the government hastened the reform programme it started in 197 5.
The most significant shift in government policy started in 1975
was granting urban African communities thirty-year leaseholds on
their properties. These legislative enactments and administra-
tive measures helped the government to destroy completely an
African middle class ( from 1955 I and then recreate it after 1975
because it was politically expedient to do so. But, one does not
have to attain high levels of analytical and theoretical sophis-
tication to know that "legislative enactments and administrative
fiat never created classes and have little force in shaping the
substance and context of class struggle unless the material con-
ditions are also propitious" (3) I own emphasis)
When the government re-opened the Western Areas Scheme in 1950
and completed it in 19bO, it had set itself the task of undermin-
ing the material conditions of the Western Areas communities so
as to rationalise its crisis-ridden labour supply policies of the
1940s and the 1950s. The destruction of Sophiatown and its
sister suburbs, Newclare and Martindale would have and contribute
toward the resolving of this crisis. The free-hold suburb's role
in generating a crisis of labour is not a mystery. Most Africans
entering the urban areas, especially Johannesburg between 193b
and 1945 were from white farms. During the second half of the
iy40s, labour shortage on white farms had reached alarming
proportions. On the other hand, white semi-skilled and unskilled
labourers were threatened by this massive labour reserve. These
two classes would be served best by a more rigorous policv of in-
flux control. But, in the context of the iy4Us and ly&Os, anv
policy was destined to fail unless the free-hold townships were
destroyed. This would deprive all Africans of free-hold rights
and they would cease to own property and thus swell the ranks of
the working class. Secondly, because locations would be easy to
administer, those who did not qualify under section lU(llla) of
the Natives (Abolition and Coordination of Documents I Act of
1 y 5 2, would be easily apprehended, charged lor contravening
pass regulations and sentenced to farm labour. 14 1 This would
guarantee an even supply of labour to farms and manufacturing in-
dustries in the towns. 15) These gains on the part of the
government became evident in the lySOs. The boom of the lbbOs
was accompanied by a calm and acquiescence reminiscent of the
years of "anguished impotence". Ib) Then came the economic slump
of the 1970s accompanied by worker action culminating in the ly?J
Durban strike and the nation-wide protest three years later.
During this period the Apartheid government applied the Native
(Urban Areas I Act of 1945 within the broadest framework outlined
in the Sauer Report. (7) However, this was executed in a
piece-meal manner, with repeated amendments to meet the require-
ments of the time. The first of the major amendments came 'in
1959 when the minister of Bantu Administration and Development
stressed that African entrepeneurs should be persuaded to trans-
fer their assets to the Bantustans" (8) Again, further restric-
tions were intoduced in 1963 limiting the number of businesses
Africans could own to one and allowing them to sell only daily
essentials for Africans. In 1968, much more stringent legal
restrictions were placed on African entrepeneurship. These in-
cluded the granting of arbitrary powers to the Administration
Boards in the control of African entrepeneurs. These powers in-
cluded allocating trading sites, approving alterations to exist-
ing buildings and finally, to show proof of homeland citizenship.
This policy was reversed when in 1975, "after a meeting between
the prime minister, Department of Bantu Administration and
homeland leaders, certain reforms affecting African traders were
introduced" (9) Henceforth, licencing of African businesses was
brought more in line with that for whites; 30-year leaseholds
were reintroduced; Partnerships were legalised and homeland
citizenship no longer entailed forfeiture of certain enterprises.
The pace of these reforms quickened in the second hall of the
1970s against the backdrop of the country-wide unrest of 197t>-
1977. One of the major consequences of these reforms has been
the emergence of an African middle class in the 1980s with a con-
siderable growth potential. But because the Apartheid state can
easily "absorb the demands of the urban African bourgeoisie ...11
is chimerical to continue proposing, and hoping to establish an
alliance of all 'nationally oppressed' classes which has as its
am the overthrow of Apartheid.' (10)
The fragmentation of urban African working class communities is
strikingly evident in African townships adjacent to Johannesburg.
Throughout the 1980s, Soweto has been characterised by an obvious
lack of appetite for confrontation. The significantly large
middle class in Soweto has. no doubt, contained the militancy of
the working class. But the emergence of this class cannot only
be explained by changes in the legal restrictions imposed on ur-
ban Africans. Attempting to understand why Soweto was different
from other African urban townships during the country-wide unrest
beginning in 1983, J. Seekings has focused on sectoral and oc-
cupational categories applying to Soweto's residents. (Ill Com-
pared to urban Africans in the PWV area, Soweto's "household in-
comes are higher, chances of individual occupational mobility
greater and the possibilities for workplace organisation (whether
formal or informal) reduced." I 12 ) Within Soweto itself,
"processes of economic differentiation are particlarly marked and
are increasingly reflected in the social geography of Soweto."
113 1 And, "the pattern of employment of Soweto residents is im-
portant because it interacts with residential patterns and
demands placed on township organisations." (14 1 However, the
most crucial distinction Seekings has identified, is that be-
tween "Soweto's Southwestern townships (Naledi, Moletsane,
Mapetla and Tladi ) and Chiawelo, inhabited by more recent ar-
rivals, Sotho/Tswana and Shangaan-speaking respectively, with
slightly lower educational qualifications and incomes," (15)
which contrast sharply with the predominantly middle class dis-
tricts of Phefeni, Dube and Mofolo. By the end of the 1970s,
"elite housing areas" in Soweto were Dube South, Orlando West Ex-
tension (Beverly Hills) and Rockville. (16)
To this latter group of townships should be added Diepkloof's
oldest residential areas established between 1957 and 1959 when
the government pursuaded Sophiatown's intransigent African
property-owners to accept the slightly bigger houses in Diepkloof
on the understanding that they are offered on a 30-year leasehold
(17 ) , as compared to the insecurity of tenure attached to the
Meadowlands housing scheme. Finally it would be curious to note
that most families in this latter group of townships (especially
those living in Dube, Rockville and Diepkloof) were former
Sophiatown propery-owners up to the time the township was
destroyed. Most families in Orlando-West Extension (Beveriey
Hills) are the middle classes of the 1950s within Soweto. Dube
South, as SM. Parnell has pointed out, was set up in 1946 by the
United Party government as a model township for the urban African
middle class. At first the houses were occupied by Soweto resi-
dents who could afford the higher costs attached to them. But
after 1953, when it had become clear that the struggle for free-
hold tenure in Sophiatown was lost, some property-owners sold
their stands and moved to Dube. (18) These decided to sell
their properties even before the removals began in 1955 and
settled in Dube.
In relocating the Sophiatown community in Soweto, the government
made ethnic division a priority. However, to blunt the edge of
resistance, class interests could not be completely ignored. The
property-owners were given a better option (as compared to
Meadowlands ) to rent sites and build their own houses in
Diepklooi' and Dube on a thirty-year leasehold; or buy a house
built by the government in Diepklooi. The Western Areas
Resettlement Board's "strategy seems to have followed the line of
least resistance." It began by moving tenants of non-African
landlords, these being followed by African traders occupying In-
dian and Chinese-owned stands and finally, "from 195/, the by
then isolated African property owners. 119) The latter group was
split into two sections: one resettling in Dube South ( Dr. Xuma
was among these) and a significant number, together with a rela-
tively wealthy tenant class resettled in Diepkloof. In the light
of these developments starting from 1950 (when the Apartheid
government re-opened the Western Areas Scheme) and 19'i3 I when
new reforms were initiated by the Vorster administration) ceasing
to view Africans as temporary so.journers in the urban areas it
would be harshly simplistic to assume that under the sway of an
increasingly repressive ideology, the homogeneity of Soweto's
residential landscape was assumed after 1955.
By 1980, most Soweto residents (except for those born in the
townships) came from either Sophiatown or Alexandra ( as a conse-
quence of the destruction of free-hold townships) 120) Others,
especially those in Orlando, had moved into the area in the
1930s, when the government destroyed inner-city communities,
relocating them to Orlando (21); and finally, as pressures in-
crease on rural economies, there is a constant flow of people
into the urban areas. At different times, these finally settled
permanently.
Sophiatown has impressed itself upon the popular consciousness as
a classical case of the consequences of community destruction.
Community destruction is more common than obverse process of com-
munity formation in South Africa. (22 1 However, examining the
process of community formation in Sophiatown offers fascinating
insights.
Much has been written already on the historical origins of
Sophiatown as a free-hold township. (23) What follows is a
sketchy outline that places emphasis on demographic changes and
how these shaped patterns of socialisation, family structures and
forms of political mobilisation. Also, the changing racial, eth-
nic and social character of Sophiatown will be examined as vari-
ables that determine the form of community that the government
destroys between 1955 and 1960. 124) Finally, it will be argued
that from its origins, Sophiatown is characterised by a dis-
tinctly middle class culture that contrasts sharply with the
working class and lumpen-proletarian culture of the slumyards





during the same period. I 4b I This new lease on the lives of
Sophiatown's landlords was also characterised by a calm atmos-
phere conclusive to making maximum gams out of rack-renting - and
thev did (Interview material). in lajy, the Second World War
broke out, forcing the government to completely suspend influx
control regulations in 194k! until the end of the war in 1945.
The consequences were that families began migrating into
Sophiatown in large numbers - placing housing facilities at a
premium. But this gain was accompanied by tensions and conflicts
between landlords and tenants which became decisive in breaking
resistance to removals in 1955. It is to these tensions and con-
flicts that the paper now focuses.
The first assault on the serenity of Sophiatown's atmosphere, in
the late 1920s proved to be of limited significance. The second,
starting from 1935 was more dramatic, but is often exaggerated.
In this section I examine the tensions that characterised the old
and the new from 1935 to 19bo when Sophiatown was relocated.
Landlords and tenants entered into complex new relations. in
some instances, tenants remember some landlords as having been
full of compassion and very kind. In an interview with Mrs.
Mashao, she remembers that their last landlord before they moved
to Soweto was so kind he even helped them carry their belongings
in his truck. Mrs. Dakile, a lady teacher in Sophiatown and very
prominent in both the erstwhile Sophiatown up to the end of the
1950s and in Diepkloof since then, confirms this compassion
among some property-owners. She points out that she was a young
wife in the 1940s and her husband owned property. Women tenants,
some much older than her, defferred to her. ''Some called me Mme
I mother)" indicating a sign of respect. (47)
However, in the majority of cases, tenants and landlords were at
each other's throats. Landlords controlled the most crucial
resources - space. They had rooms for renting; water; access to
toilets and finally, and most decisively, they held the key to
the establishment of shebeens in their yards. 1 will examine
each of these resources and demonstrate how they relate to pat-
terns of political mobilisation, starting with the last.
Liquor and shebeens have been central to the Marabi culture of
the slumyard. while this culture formed and matured around
inner-city working class communities, it only becomes a feature
of Sophiatown's convivial weekends after 19ii5. Clearly it of-
fended the middle class sensibilities of some, if not most. In-
sisting on temperance, they would refuse to rent rooms to any
tenant found brewing liquor and selling it on their premises. a
classical example of such landlords is Mr. Raletebele, who ad-
mitted in an interview to have refused to accept and promptly
evicted tenants who brewed and sold illicit liquor.
A: M\ father had two properties, one in Miller Street, where
we had our family house: and the other was n (iibson Street.
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Q: Did you, like other property owners, lock your taps at
intervals?
A: Initially 1 did. But in Gibson Street it became dif-
ficult because some tenants returned home very late at
night...Then I decided that those tenants in Gibson Street
should immediately with their brewing business. They did,
but shortly after, they were at it again. 1 threatened to
call on the police but that did not help. So one day, 1
called in the police and actually showed them where the beer-
was concealed. That is, how I finally put a stop to brewing
on my property. (48)
Illicit liquor brewing and dealing was the cornerstone of
slumyard economies. But, during the 1910s and l'J^Os, Sophiatown,
as I have shown, was little touched by the shebeen culture, the
Marabi. When the local authorities attempted to enforce prohibi-
tion, it was the poor whites and the unemployed among them
(especially Afrikaans-speaking) who took to the trade and il-
licitly distributed liquor. (49 1 These poor whites were referred
to as drankwesie, perceived to be at the base of white society
and considered to be, socially, in closer proximity with kaf-
firkwesi (50). The sharp contrast between the social character
of inner-city slums and communities and Sophiatown is reflected
clearly in the sentiment expressed by Colonel Jackson, quoted
earlier. He laments the lost opportunity of developing an ideal
African suburb. This sentiment reflected the general attitudes
of most property owners and Mr. Raletebele's is no exception.
Prohibition as enforced by property-owners was linked to the ten-
sion around restrictions on water. Property owners (especially
African property-owners) were always alarmed that excessive use
of water increased the rates charged by the JCC for services
provided. Brewing, requiring as it does large quantities of
water, was strongly resented by some property-owners. This was
besides the fact that shebeens tended to draw into the yards per-
sons some poperty-owners would consider of to be of dubious
character. (A series of interviews with Mr. Raletebele, Mrs.
Dakile and Mrs. Nhlapho )
Throughout the 1940s, Sophiatown remained relatively calm. The
tensions and clashes between landlords and tenants loomed large
throughout the decade, while the JCC had momentarily cailed a
truce between itself and Sophiatown property-owners - a truce
forced upon the JCC by the Native Laws Amendment Act. However, a
resolution was taken again in 1944 to have the Western Areas
removed. But again this resolution was left in abeyance for
another six years.
Prohibition on brewing and closure of taps, it has been shown,
were two causes of resentment among tenants. The third, and of-
ten most devastating to tenants was eviction. Given the low wage
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levels of the 1930s and 1940s (51), and the ubiquity of tragedy
in tenant families, failure to pay rent was a constant threat.
Added to these pressures was the third, which often manifested
itself in far-reaching and serious consequences - the high labour
turnover during this period. Men lost jobs in quick succession.
The loss of a .iob and of income inevitably led to eviction.
Landlords (especially African landlords) were notorious tor their
intolerance to rent defaulters. In some cases, whole families
were evicted with disheartening consequences. Some tenants con-
tested their evictions in court (Interview with Mr Morolong
(though this occurred very rarely. The fact that most tenants
could not contest evictions in court could be explained by the
fact that they probably did not qualify under pass laws to be in
the urban areas - or if they did, they were legally assigned to
controlled townships. Howver, in the 1940s, when families
migrated to urban areas, the number of tenants seeking accomoda-
tion grew tremendously. Landlords often offered rooms to the
highest bidder. (52) This generated greater resentments among
tenants who were at times forced to make way for tenants offering
higher rents - or pay higher rents themselves.
This accumulated tradition of tension and conflict between
African landlords and tenants in Sophiatown cannot be over-looked
especially when the timid resistance to removals in 1955 has to
be explained- It is not only these tensions that set these two
social classes apart. But, some crucial elements such as family
structure, forms of socialisation, educational opportunities, the
degree of christianisation*, work attitudes and perceptions about
social and upward mobility. All these are crucial distinguishing
features that help decipher the complex social character of
Sophiatown's community. Most of these elements however, fall
outside the scope of this paper. I will, only briefly, discuss
three of these elements. 1. Family structure 2. Educational
Opportunities 3. The Influences of Christianity.
1. Family Structure.
A great deal of studies on the making of African working classes
tend to neglect family structures and how they shape broader so-
cial patterns. But, recently recognition has been given to
family as crucial in determining political responses of specific
social classes. (53) And in Sophiatown, as in its successor
townships, the influence has been so great that it is inex-
plicable why the subject has been neglected.
A~s already stated, the census of 1921 show there were 1457
Africans living in the Western Areas of Sophiatown at the time.
I have shown that there is a higher probability that Africans in
the Western Areas at the time would have been property-owning
families - sometimes extended families, though the possibility of
a residential tenantry has not been completely left out. Unlike
families forming around slumyards, which are essentially loose,
"Vat-en-sit""" as soc 1 a~tions ( 5"4~) , prcfpVr'ty-owriing families are
based on carefully conducted marriages, often having been consum-
mated in the rural areas. There are no statistics outl.unim I,he
average age of all persons living in the Western Areas in the
1920s. Nor are there statistics outlining the average of heads
of families and also their level and sources of income. but oral
testimony has done a lot to suggest crude generalisations. There
is a combination of migrancy and industrial employment involving
whole families. Share-cropping and labour tenancy were still
highly rewarding. Land or property was being purchased by the
patriarchi probably still resident in the rural areas and working
in an "akoord" with a farmer. Having several wives [often two Lo
three), and sons, he would have the eldest occupy the house on
the property so purchased. In this way, families be^in to Turin
rather earlier. During the course of the decade, as labour
tenants were being progressively pushed•off the land, a Liny
minority had opportunities of investing in properties in the ur-
ban areas. But, they cease to be semi-migrant as labour tenancy
becomes increasingly less rewarding. This process takes definite
shape from the middle of the 1930s. In the 1920s these African
property-owning families live in modest houses, having erected
shacks in the backyard for an tenant or two.
Tenants, on the other hand, were often male and unmarried. The
sex- ratio changed dramatically in the 1930s as more women en-
tered the area and sought work as domestic servamts in the North-
ern suburbs of Johannesburg. (55) These were predominantly
Tswana-speaking and settled mainly in Sophiatown. Vet another
group of women, distinctly Sotho-speaking from Lesotho gravitated
toward Newciare. These women rented single rooms or moved in
with close relatives while job-hunting. The latter case explains
the origins of sub-tenancy. In some cases, this temporary ar-
rangement became permanent whether the sub-tenant finally found a
job or not. And the sub-tenant might be joined by a spouse and
consequently two families emerge, living in a single room. (50)
The tendency (especially among the Tswana), was to send children
to their grandparents in the villages. (56)
The 1950 survey has revealed that Sophiatown had an obvious
preponderance of single-member families (27%) over Western Native
Township (7%). More striking is the fact that 7'J% of males j.n
free-hold townships were of working age, and 67% of females were
also of working age. (57). In Sophiatown, where village Lies,
especially among the Tswana were still powerful, meant Lhat most
children grew up away from parents. in Newciare, where the
Basotho, mainly Mattashea predominated is unclear. Crudely speal-
'ing, single-member families 127%) were tenants. So, these Imrdly
lived in family circumstances of generally acceptable standards.
Again, because tenants, especially Tswana-speakinij; were IJulitly
linked with the village economies, they tended to focus more on
developments there. (58) In a new setting, therefore, these
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groups tend to retain some aspects of rural ideologies and fuse
these with those obtaining in a new setting. (59). This is
clearly evident in the kinds of social networks they create, (bO )
'I • Educational Opportunities.
Property-owners lived with their children as early as the 1910s.
Very early on education had become central to the upbringing of
children in these families. By the 1920s and 1930s, a sig-
nificant number of children of these property-owning families
were in such prominent mission schools as Adams College,
Marianhill in Natal and Maria-Zena in Matatieie. There is also
the prominent Methodist school near Pietersburg. Finally there
was the Institute Thaba-Nchu, Moroka Teacher Training Institute.
The urban African petty bourgeoisie of the 1940s and 1950s had a
stong influence of mission education. Sophiatown was also sig-
nificant in this regard. Hence, "at its (Sophiatown's) apex was
a petty bourgeoisie, consisting of professional people, teachers
and ministers, clerical workers as well as traders, craftsmen and
landlords." (61) So, when the government moved in 1951 to take
over the mission schools (62), it must have touched upon an issue
too crucial and sensitive to this social group. However, there
is no evidence of a clearly, consciously orchestrated opposition
by this class to the introduction of Bantu Education. On the
contrary, it appears to have derived support first from the
under-classes before they themselves saw in Bantu Education an
opportunity to have their children educated. (63) Throughout the
1960s and half of the 1970s, these boarding schoolds remained the
last bastion of middle class education. When, toward the end of
the 1960s Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana became independent,
these families sent their children to schools in those countries
in the 1970s. Schools like Maru-a-pula in Botswana and Waterford
in Swaziland (with excellent academic standards I were the haven
of children from such families. The ultimate ambition for these
children would be university education either in the same
countries or abroad - Britain and the USA. This became an in-
creasing trend in the 1980s (Interview with Mr Diale). It is
tentatively suggested that these form the core of the urban
African middle class of the 1980s and 1990s.
3. Church and Chritianity.
The impact of mission churches in Sophiatown have been depicted
as having been almost dramatic. (64) To broaden their con-
stituencies, mission churches provided education and set up other
welfare structures. Some prominent clerics (Father Huddlestone)
are said to have wielded so much influence that most people be-
came endeared towards him. In short, church was a powerful in-
stitution that affected residents at almost every turn.
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However, caution is advised. Church also tended to reflect the
broader social divide. Although church membership did cut across
both tenant and landlord class. the latter had internalised
Christian values much more profound! v llnter\ iei' with Mrs.
Dakile). 'tenants tended to respond t.o a different set o I social
and family problems which placed too high a premium on leisure-
time. "My tenants did not attend church reeuiarl>. 'lhe* drank
heavily over the weekends an spent more time l'i ghtina"'. I Interview
with Mr. Dakile) Some respondents have suggested that weekends
anti holidays were spent wiLh children and their grandparents m
the countryside. Iba 1 In a sense. many tenants attended
churches, though Christian values were not fully internalised.
Children from property-owning families on account 01 early ex-
perience, with scriptures and fully appreciate Christian values.
This also helped to shape their attitude to crime.
By the end of the 1940s, that is the type of communit> that has
emerged. In any conflict there are winners and losers. Tenants
who lost the battle against evictions tended to slide further
down the social ladder. The ultimate late of most of these was
to join the servile class known in the township argot as
diepamokoti I Interview with Mr. Webber I The literal meaning of
this word is "trench-digger". Diepamokoti were found around
shebeens. They were given free accomodation and food for per-
forming almost all household chores. However, they derive their
name from one major activity - digging trenches used to conceal
liqour and having the responsibility of hiding barrels of illicit
brew, The reason for theis is simple. Where the wife of a
landlord was also a brewer, she would not be caught in the act of
hiding liquor. This was contrary to social convention. A seepa-
mokoti (singular - seepa ; plural - deipamokoti ) could be ar-
rested, convicted and fined, where upon the landlord would pay
the fine.
With these powerful centrifugal forces at work, .Sophiatown was
faced with extinction - when, in 1950, the JCC re-opened discus-
sions on the Western Areas. What remained to be seen was whether
Sophiatown would live up to its reputation as "the hotbed of
African resistance". (6b) Would the community, in defence of it-
self, draw on the accumulated tradition of delensiveness and in-
ner unity? I ti'i )
The years 1949-1950 represent a turning point in the political
character of Sophiatown. In 1949 the community embarks on a mas-
sive boycott of trams that lasted for three month. ( t>8 I . In 19S0
there are three isolated incidents of clashes between residents
and police. (69) The first is caused by the intransigence of a
pass offender, whereupon the residents joined in the scuffle
(70); the second arises from a policeman's attempt to arrest a
man in possession of illegal brew. Again the crowd intervenes
and a riot develops. The last, well organised action was the Ma>
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Dav stay-away called Lo protest the banning of leading SACP and
Indian Congress members. At the end ol the May Day riot, thir-
teen people had died.
A closer analysis of these events would reseai that ascribing the
spirit ol community dei'ensiveness and unity to the events is ex-
aggerated. In respect ol the tram boycotts for instance, the
evidence tends to contradict the claim. Not all residents used
trams. Those towards the centre of the township used buses and
were unaffected by the rise in tram fares. In effect, because
trams moved in routs running almost on the outskirts of
Sophiatown, it was the residents of Western Native Township who
were greatly affected I Interview with Mrs. Nhlapo)
Secondly, the arrest for the illicit brew occurs in Newclare,
where brewing is more central to the local economy tiiat m
Sophiatown because of the preponderance of absentee landlordism*.
Thirdly, the May Day stay-away was clearly well supported. But,
whether there was clarity on the issues is an entirely different
matter. The scepticism toward non-Africans may have been cleared
at the level of leadership. But, it is doubtful whether the
masses had adjusted to this shift from the policies of the lbMUs.
Indeed, the support may have been occasioned by the fact that one
of the affected people - J.B Marks was popular in the Western
Areas. On the other hand, it seems Marks was known more for his
trade union work - especially among miners - than as a community
leader. 171)
ironically, the events of 11)49-1950 had the effect of hardening
the government's resolve in removing the Western Areas, (72) The
JCC and the white community in adjacent suburbs cited the
violence of recent months as reason for wanting to speed up the
process of removals. Historians have responded insensitively to
the "alarmist" nature of government reports. Unrest, prior to
]ybU, is always exaggerated in official records. The reason is
simple - the government had to justify the need to remove
Africans from the periphery of the city. The alarmist tone of
governnment reports changed after 1y 7 b - it always assured the
white community hat "the situation in Black townships is tense,
but calm" when in some instances, scores of people had died with
the government having full knowledge of the details.
By lyol it had become clear that removals were a priority in both
local and central government policy. I ?3 ) Once again, property-
owners geared themselves for yet another round of struggle with
the JCC. This time, the issue was not longer proclamation, but
removal to Soweto. Property-owners re-constituted themselves and
formed' an "Action-Committee" 174) The ANC did not involve itself
in the campaign until 1953 when the Defiance Campaign had dis-
sipated. In that year the JCC, having laid the foundation for
the removals sold Meadowlands to the central government, deciar-
lb
ing at the same time that it had no responsibility for the
scheme. (75) Up until then, African Anti-Expropriation.
Ratepayers Association IAAERA) had continued a " desultory and
unrewarding correspondence with, firstly, the Minister of Native
Affairs, and later, the City Council. (76) When they failed to
make any impression, the plight of the Western Areas were
publicised countrywide and internationally, and conferences were
held as far afield as Durban. But the government, having dis-
pensed with the JCC and set up the Western Areas Resettlement
Board, moved relentlessly towards actualising removals. (77)
By the second half of 1954, the rhetoric of the resistance move-
ment had changed - beginning to address tenants. Tenants were
reminded that loss of free-hold rights for property-owners would
remove any possibility of their (tenants) acquiring their own
properties. (78) Nothing is heard of tenant participation until
the first day of removals, when they load their goods onto
trucks and headed for Meadowiands. Attempts were made to deploy
youth gangs, with litle success. (79) Frankly, there is no sub-
stantial evidence to show that the ANC had a plan to thwart the
government's scheme at the very last moment. Equally contentious
is the social composition of the marchers on the day of removals.
Allegations that the Freedom Volunteers were sons and daughters
of property-owners were not far-fetched.
As I mentioned earlier, property-owning families were often ex-
tended families and some relatives could at the same time be
tenants. Diepamokoti (trench-diggers I would at times be fully in-
corporated into the family and even adopt the family name. The
surnames they adopt would have been the landlord's surname. In
this way they could be taken together with the family and
resettled without falling prey to police-screening (Interviews
with Meadowiands residents). However, this would not entail
freedom from their servile duties.
In fact, the method of screening itself had too many loopholes.
For instance, those who were applying for passes for the first
time only had to prove they had been living in Sophiatown for
five years and more. To qualify, the applicant had to answer
certain questions about Sophiatown. (80) One would be asked
questions like, "Whose house is the biggest in Toby Street?",
whereupon tVie applicant would answer: "Dr. Xuma's" If you had
been living in Sophiatown for five years or more, you would be
familiar with such details and would thus easily qualify. (81)
It is at this time that a system of lodger-permits in the loca-
tions was intensified. (82)
Young single men in regular employment could apply for lodgers
permits which were often readily granted. (83) it has to be
borne in mind that at this stage the Western Areas Resettlement
Board was eager to remove as many people than it was of screening
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them properly. In fact, even those who had just arrived saw in
registering themselves an opportunity of getting a house in
Meadowlands. (84) The other option available to single, young
men was the hostels. (The 1950 survey I That young unmarried men
were alarmed by the prospects of being huddled into labour camps
and therefore called for an armed resistance (85) only serves to
deepen the myth that Sophiatown has been steeped in.
The powerful centrifugal forces that tore the community have
either been deliberately downplayed (by Nationalist bourgeoisie
academics) or taken for granted (by materialist hisoriansI. The
general picture that emerges is one of a community - and com-
munity in the strictest sense. The underlying assumption is,
as Nationalist theoreticians would like us to believe, that
Sophiatown was a community that suffered national oppression and
therefore was mobilised regardless of different class positions
and interests. On the other hand, materialist historians have
pointed to the narrowness of the material base. Hence, in South
Africa, there are merely "black middle class" strata of tightly
limited social mobility whose fate is linked with that of worker
and peasant. (86) Evidence analysed in this paper shows that
there were major clashes of interests as well as structural
cleavages that could not be easily covered up by such popular
issues as removals. The forces at play during the period 1935 to
1950 are crucial in determining the tenacity of "internal defen-
siveness" pressuposed to be the hallmark of any community.
Again, such "internal defensiveness" is often demonstrated by a
cohesive response to an external threat. But in the case of
Sophiatown, removals were a threat to free-hold rights
(landlord's privileges) wheras Meadowlands provided an ameliora-
tion of declining housing standards (tenant's anxieties) Clearly,
a consciously formulated strategy for an alliance between
landlords and tenants was required. In themselves, the objective
conditions could not miraculously produce such an alliance.
The argument that the African middle class in South Africa is
having a narrow space in which to become upwardly-mobile and
makes it undifferenciated from the under classes, is anomalous.
This conclusion is arrived at on the basis of economic in-
dicators. Income levels, property-ownership and the size of en-
terprises in Sophiatown have been characterised as having been so
marginal that class differentiation has been completely ruled
out. But, these ecomonic indicators are not adequate explanatory
tools to use in deciphering the complex class structure of
Sophiatown's community. During the 1910s and 1920s, a sig-
nificant proportion of Sophiatown's families were partly depend-
ant on various forms of labour tenancy in the rural areas and in-
dustrial or mining employment in the towns. Hence, the material
basis was more extensive than is often reckoned.
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In conclusion, I will tie up some loose ends in this paper. 1
argue, in the beginning that state legislation and administrative
measures have limited force in shaping the "context and substance
of class struggle" 1 in the urban areas) as TJ Keegan has
demonstrated in respect of capital accumulation in the
countryside. It therefore cannot be assumed that during the
period 1960 and 1975, through legislation, all Africans in urban
areas, including the PWV area, were turned into working classes.
Having assumed this scholars have been led to view the reform of
state policy starting from 1975 as the first step towards creat-
ing a middle class. On the contrary I argue, the middle class of
the 1940s and 1950s were not completely destroyed at the end of
the latter decade. Because it survived in a variety of forms,
chief of which was the ability to reproduce itself, though in
limited quantities, through education. I have shown that they
sent their children to relatively elite schools (to surviving
mission schools - between 1960-1970) then to elite schools with
excellent academic standards in Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho.
The ultimate for these has often been a degree; in the USA or
Britain and subsequently a top position in the corporate world in
the 1980s. Though this is a crude generalisation, a more sensi-
tive research will most likely reveal a picture that closely ap-
proximates the above generalisation.
Housing shows the limitations of legislationin shaping the con-
text of class struggle. I proceed to examine how a geography of
class emerges in Soweto. Relying heavily on Seekings's paper, 1
show that the class-divided landscape of Soweto in the 1960s and
1970s was a necessary concession the government had to make, to
implement the thorny Western Areas Scheme from the second half of
the 1950s to the end of the decade. I may add that it is no
coincidence that those townships that Seeking has characterised
as being middle class in the period 1978-1984, (Dube South, Rock-
ville and Diepkloof*), are associated mainly with the
government's pacifict policies toward Sophiatown's *middle
classes of the 1950s, especially property-owning middle classes.
It is also no coincidence that in the Johannesburg area, it is
children of families from these townships who dojminate the cor-
porate world and raise questions of the possible alliances they
will enter into in the future. Crucial amongst these questions
is whether they will enter alliances with the African working
class or became instruments in the hands of the state and white
capital. But, with the experiences of the 1950s (especialjy the
removals issue), it is clear that class cleavages, whatever form
they take, have to be given full recognition. The narrowness of
the material bases do not necessarily preclude different class
interests obtaining - each struggling for hegemony. 1 conclude
here by pointing out that the early Sophiatown community, with
its serene atmosphere and middle class pretensions, had twice
suffered large-scale assault before the removals in 1955. in
both occassions, it survived: first it was the dramatic impact
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